Thursday, July 14, 2005

Afghanistan Part II

Australia’s decision to deploy further troops to Afghanistan is yet another political response to a social issue. As an isolated gesture, which it is, it is unlikely to lead to a significant improvement of the situation in Afghanistan. In purely immediate terms, there is no doubt that Afghanistan does require further military assistance from outside. But the country is not a theme park, and it is dangerously incorrect to assume that the Taliban, if not Al Qaeda, can be isolated from the general population with the use of Special Forces, helicopters and precision ordinance.

According to former SAS commander Jim Wallace, a 'significant contingent of army engineers' is also expected to be sent. If that happens, it will be a welcome development. Until that happens, Australia’s response may only be judged on the basis of the commitment of a few hundred SAS soldiers. That decision represents a further lack of imagination on the part of the government when it comes to combating terrorism.

The present situation in Afghanistan is fundamentally the same situation that has existed since the Taliban were first removed from power. Lawlessness is endemic as the country is controlled by different war lords. The Taliban have shaved their beards and have been absorbed into the local populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ethnically, the people in much of the region between the two countries are the same. They are Pashtun, and people’s loyalties are attached to a mix of ethnic and tribal affiliations. Accepting this is key to understanding the social dynamics in Afghanistan.

Over a year ago, I visited the tribal region buffeting Afghanistan and Pakistan near the city of Peshawar. I was told that the Afghan troops patrolling the main gateway between Pakistan and Afghanistan at Torkum were, to a man, ex-Taliban. How did my guide know? The soldiers’ affiliation was tribal, not political. They followed whosoever their tribal leaders followed. Where once their leaders supported the Taliban, now they supported Karzai. Times had changed, as did the garb. It was pure expedience. Afghanistan’s warlords and their patriarchal social set up still operates in this way. There is nothing to suggest that the situation has fundamentally changed. The Afghans ‘we’ will fight alongside are fair weather friends, and there is no intrinsic reason why we should expect their friendship to be any different. The conditions necessary for the development of lasting peace in Afghanistan, let alone democracy, are still a distant dream. Such development cannot be reached through the barrel of a gun.

Just as Iraq was favoured for Western intervention at a time when Afghanistan was deemed too ugly to be newsworthy, Afghanistan now has been invoked (at least, for the time being, by the Australian Government) to deflect eyes away from the mess in Iraq. We do well to assume that advisers in nice suits have assured our government that sending troops to Afghanistan will make the Howard Government look proactive in the never-ending War on Terrorism. No doubt the Government hopes it will persuade a skeptical population that the Government knows what it is doing. They may also think that it keeps us in favour at the White House. The reality is that, yet again, Australia is treading where it ought not to tread. Rightly or, more likely, wrongly, would-be terrorists will therefore feel that they now have a right to ‘tread’ on our territory.

There is literally billions of dollars in Afghanistan - from US bribes to warlords and the smuggled goods trade owing to the fact that Afghanistan is a regional centre for the black market. Yet public services (schools, roads, etc) have literally nothing. Nothing of note has been done to improve that situation, because our governments have no interest in any long term investment in Afghan society.

Most media have reported favourably on the deployment and no one can seriously object to the idea of ensuring that Afghanistan is not neglected. Paul McGeough, for one, seems to be on the right track when he argues

Australian management and staffing of one of the provincial reconstruction teams that entwine security and reconstruction in the new Afghanistan would be a meaningful contribution to a country fractured by decades of war and hardship.

Unfortunately, he goes further to support the deployment of Australia special forces as a 'money-where-our-mouth-is use of Australian military resources'. Who is he to say the deployment is good or bad? Just because a white man visits a foreign land doesn’t mean he knows the place inside out. Have we bothered to obtain an independent local voice? Would we want to know what they’d say?

The problem with a lot of war correspondents is that they spend so much time chasing war zones that they often assume the people they see there have no other capacities. Hence their proposals for western engagement with those regions tend to have a militarist flavour. Similar sentiments were expressed, post-facto, about the Rwandan genocide of 1994. So much commentary focused on UN or general logistical failures and ensuring in future we have some sort of rapid military response. But what about corporations in G8 nations drastically reducing their output of conventional weapons which they happily sell to antagonists in Africa?*

Not a word. In a way I can understand. A war correspondent isn’t best place to ask such questions. Then again, if all we want to do is look at conflicts around the world in isolation and avoid deeper analysis, it serves us well to just pan across some devastated landscape and bemoan this bitch of a world.

* In the case of Rwanda circa 1994, French companies knowingly sold weapons to troops committing the atrocities. For further information on this, read this excellent piece.

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